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Twenty-Seventh Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from
21 August through 27 August 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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28 August 1973

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Twenty-Seventh Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
21 August through 27 August 1973)

The Key Points

- No new southbound infiltration of combat troops from North Vietnam was detected during the week. A few new civilian and military specialists were observed moving south on the infiltration routes.
- North Vietnamese logistic activity remained at a low to moderate rainy season level except in northern South Vietnam, where both military and civilian supply activities continued at a brisk pace.
- Combat activity in both South Vietnam and Laos was at a low level during the week.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the twenty-seventh in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. During the past week, no new North Vietnamese combat troops were observed infiltrating to the south. Thirteen small groups totalling about 275 civilian and military specialists, however, were detected for the first time moving toward South Vietnam. Since the "second" ceasefire of 15 June, more than 7,000 North Vietnamese personnel--including some 5,500 combat troops--have now been detected starting the infiltration trip south. In the seven-month period since the signing of the original ceasefire agreement, more than 57,000 personnel have moved through the infiltration pipeline. Of these, more than 32,000 started the trek since 27 January, while about 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. (ANNEX B, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)

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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	VC/NVA	RVNAF
172,000	287,000	83,000	85,000
		325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		320B	1st
		312th ³	2nd
		304th	3rd
		711th	Regional Forces
		2nd	


1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes present for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions.

3. The headquarters and divisional support units are currently located deep within North Vietnam.

VC/NVA	RVNAF
29,000	57,000
320th	23rd
10th	22nd
3rd	Regional Forces

VC/NVA	RVNAF
28,000	78,000
1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	44th Special Tactical Zone
	Regional Forces



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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

2. Logistic movement in the Vinh area remains moderate according to our most recent evidence. On 17 August, 11 railcars carrying gasoline arrived at the Cho Si railroad station, about 25 miles north of Vinh, and were scheduled for transshipment further south. Several days later on 19 August, a storage area near Vinh reportedly received about 30 tons of ordnance. In addition [redacted]

[redacted] between 17 and 21 August at least 325 tons of cargo had been shipped on barges in the Vinh area and that another 240 tons remained to be sent.

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3. Logistic activity in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle between Quang Khe and the DMZ continued to be fairly heavy during this period, and included the movement of considerable quantities of ordnance. [redacted] on 17 August over 1,050 tons of unidentified cargo remained in several storage areas in the southern Panhandle. On the following day, another unit in southern Quang Binh Province reportedly received 150 tons of assorted ammunition from a logistic unit located west of Vinh and 33 tons of ammunition from a unit operating in the Hanoi area. On 20 August, another 135 tons of ammunition were shipped to a storage area in Quang Binh Province, also from logistic units operating in the Vinh and Hanoi areas. Another report, covering the first twenty days of August, indicated that over 900 tons of cargo, mostly ammunition, had been shipped in this period to a logistic unit operating in southern Quang Binh Province. Between 16 and 22 August, 108 northbound and 122 southbound vehicles were observed crossing the Xuan Son Bridge on the Troc River southwest of Quang Khe, and on 22 August some 130 tons of ordnance were received at a storage area in southern Quang Binh Province.

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Laos and Cambodia

4. Although heavy rains continue to inhibit logistic movement throughout most areas of Laos, some

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activity was noted. Recently received information indicates 36 vehicles were active in the area of the Plaine des Jarres on 10 August. A report of 21 August stated that over 100 NVA supply vehicles were active in the Laos Panhandle during a recent, unspecified period. Also on 21 August, five vehicles were detected moving north and eight south on Route 99 northeast of Saravane. Some North Vietnamese units in the Panhandle continue to be engaged in road construction work. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which are mentioned in this memorandum.)

South Vietnam


5. A high volume of logistic activity was again noted on the Communist's new "western supply corridor" inside South Vietnam this week. On 17 August, 150 vehicles were active along this corridor. Two days later on 19 August, a logistic unit operating along the corridor reportedly received 320 tons of cargo and dispatched 230 tons. On 23 August, some 630 vehicles were detected moving along the routes comprising the western corridor. Reports of the same day indicated that some 3,300 tons of cargo remained in two storage areas along Route 548. Finally, [redacted] during the period 21 August to 10 September a storage area along Route 548 was to receive from 2,000 to 2,750 tons of rice.

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6. In other areas of northern South Vietnam, limited evidence also points to substantial movement of cargo. [redacted] 61 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border and another 55 vehicles were seen on the route the following day. Also on 20 August, 37 vehicles were detected on Route 1 north of Dong Ha and 16 trucks were observed on Route 608 northwest of Khe Sanh. [redacted] 79 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the junction with Route 6089. An average of 85 vehicles were active daily in the Cua Viet River area between 18 and 22 August, and on 22 August it was reported that the major logistic entity in this area received

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nearly 2,400 tons of cargo during an unspecified time period.

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (21-27 Aug) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January "Ceasefire"</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June "Ceasefire"</u>		<u>Last Week (21-27 Aug)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,173	4,086	148	727	30	95
MR 2	429	2,966	165	1,112	15	118
MR 3	515	3,581	113	1,005	8	60
MR 4	902	8,333	224	2,167	23	196
Totals	3,019	18,966	650	5,011	76 (78)	469 (451) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.


8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

(See Reverse Side of Page)



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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B. Laos

9. Communist-initiated combat activity was at a very low level during the reporting period.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

Possible NVA-Khmer Communist Accord in Southern Cambodia

10. After a round of intensified fighting last week, the North Vietnamese and Khmer Communists (KC) may have worked out a fragile accommodation in Kampot Province. In a 24 August intercepted message, elements of the 52nd Regiment of the NVA 1st Division were ordered to adhere strictly to a ceasefire with the KC, but to be alert for any perfidy on the part of the KC. This order follows by only a few days the first detected instance in which these same NVA units were ordered to take offensive actions against the KC. Prior to last week, the NVA had restricted themselves to reacting to KC initiatives against their positions. Given the animosities between the KC and the NVA in this region of Cambodia, the odds are not very good that the new ceasefire will prove to be a lasting affair.

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ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South

1. No new combat infiltration groups were detected at any point in the infiltration system during the reporting period. Some 100 civilian and military specialists in eight groups, however, were observed entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. All of these groups are traveling to Communist Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue in northern South Vietnam. In addition, five small groups with an estimated strength of 175 specialists were noted farther south in the system in the Laotian Panhandle/Quang Tri Province border area. The latter groups, which are destined for VC Military Region 5 and the B-3 Front, are believed to have departed North Vietnam some two to three weeks ago. Table 1 below shows the infiltration of combat troops since 1 September 1972, by destination, and Table 2 summarizes total infiltration starts--including specialists--since 1 January 1973.

Table 1

Infiltration Starts: Combat Troops
Leaving North Vietnam for the South,
by Destination*

	<u>1 Sep 1972-30 Jun 1973**</u>	<u>1 Jul-27 Aug 1973</u>
Total	<u>94,000</u>	<u>4,600</u>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	33,000 (CIA) ,36,000 (DOD)	0
MR 5	9,000	3,100
B-3 Front	14,000 (CIA) ,11,000 (DOD)	0
COSVN	26,000	0
Southern Laos and MR 559	12,000	1,500

* This table includes only combat infiltration groups, and omits special-purpose groups. There are minor differences between the DOD and the CIA concerning the number of personnel destined for specific areas listed on this table. Where such differences exist both the CIA and the DOD estimates are given.

** For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define the "infiltration year" as beginning on 1 September, which roughly coincides with the start of the dry season along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle each year.

Table 2

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total^{1/}</u>	<u>Special-Purpose</u>
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June 1-15	825	325
June 16-30	1,375	375
July 1-15	1,900	175
July 16-31	1,750	425
August 1-6	1,925	425
August 7-13	175	175
August 14-20	0	0
August 21-27	100	100

1/ Including gap-filled groups, except groups 7001-7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups departed after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops would be added to the infiltration starts shown above.

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